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University Kristiansand
A b s t r a c t . The article describes the economic, social and political 
consequences of World War I for Norway. It deals with how the 
country’s chosen neutral stance was being undermined and in 
this context its relationship with the belligerent parties. It tries 
to answer the question why Norway did not become directly en­
gaged in the war, and finally looks into the changes in Nor­
wegian society and foreign policy brought about by the war.
The main goal of Norwegian foreign policy after the 
union with Sweden had been dissolved in 1905, was to consolidate the 
newly found independence. To achieve this, it was essential that the 
country should stay out of armed conflicts, it was thought. To this end 
a policy which aimed at securing Norway’s neutrality was adopted. 
A treaty with the four Great Powers of the day guaranteed her inde­
pendence and territorial integrity. Quite apart from that the Norwegians 
took comfort from their country’s out-of-the-way geographical position.1
In 1914 only few politicians or others anticipated an early war. The 
events in 1814 (when the Napoleonic wars had led to separation from 
Denmark and had landed Norway in a new union with Sweden, whereby 
she had gained some degree of political freedom) were being celebrated. 
The nation’s thoughts were turned to its history; a mood of national self­
absorption, overshadowing international events, was typical. The cente­
nary exhibition in Kristiania (later Oslo) provided a beautiful setting for 
the results achieved by Norwegian industry. ‘Idyllic’ was a word which 
was frequently used in the press about this exhibition, and the same de­
1 Berg, page 251.
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scription may apply to the general frame of mind in Norway the first 
seven months of 1914.2
There were a few, however, who -  inspired by a similar movement in 
Sweden -  called for increased spending on defence. They received the fol­
lowing reply from the prime minister, the Liberal Gunnar Knudsen:
‘What’s on? That would be interesting to know. After all, for the time 
being, the political situation, from an international point of view, is un­
clouded to a degree which has not been seen for years.’3
The same Knudsen had been on holiday on his private yacht for two 
weeks while events on the international arena took on an increasingly 
threatening character. July 27th (two days after the deadline set for a 
reply to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia) he noted in his log book: ‘We 
had by now been without newspapers for three days and so were 
mightily surprised when, upon our arrival at Langesund «a small coastal 
town in southern Norway», we learned that Europe was standing at the 
abyss of war.’4
The kind of preparations which had been made on the economic front 
fully matched his surprise. The first week of August was characterized 
by panic buying. The prices of grain, flour and other basic foodstuffs rose 
accordingly. Riots broke out. The police was often powerless and soldiers 
had to be called in.5
Panic also struck the banks, which regularly refused to exchange for­
eign currencies. Many industries laid off workers, and several large con­
struction works -  financed from abroad -  abruptly came to an end. Con­
siderable unemployment was thus created. Shipping experienced a few 
very anxious weeks; world trade had almost ground to a halt during the 
initial confusion, freight rates had fallen drastically, while at the same 
time the risks involved had increased. The outcome was that many ships 
were laid up, in Norway as in the world over.6
When World War I broke out, no more than nine years had passed 
since the break-up of the union with Sweden, and the Norwegians had to 
take into account a not inconsiderable degree of bitterness which re­
mained in certain Swedish quarters. A relatively influential group with 
German leanings worked actively for Swedish engagement in the war on 
the side of the Central Powers. The Norwegian government also had 
other reasons to believe that its Swedish counterpart had chosen a policy 
sympathetic to Germany -  an unpleasant prospect as fear was expressed
2 Hambro, Chapter I; Keilau 1927, Chapter I.
3 Fuglum 1989, page 196.
4 E’ iglum 1989, page 203.
5 T0nnesen, page 9.
6 Christensen, page 14.
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by the military that Germany’s war strategy included an attack on 
Norway.7
However, shortly after the outbreak of war, following a Swedish ini­
tiative, the two countries exchanged verbal assurances that they would 
take care not to end up in a situation where ‘fire was exchanged between 
them’. Later a joint declaration stated that ‘the two governments are in 
agreement to exclude the possibility that the state of war in Europe 
should under any circumstances lead to one of the countries taking 
hostile measures directed against the other’.8 A subsequent meeting of 
the three Scandinavian monarchs (the Danish king was also invited) was 
meant to demonstrate to the outside world the friendly and close rela­
tionship between the three countries (December 1914)7
The cooperation of the Scandinavian countries during World War I 
has, on the whole, been seen in a positive light by later historians. Pro­
fessor Keilau who views the Swedish monarch, Gustav V, as a prime 
mover behind this ‘policy of reconciliation’, detects motives of an ‘idealis­
tic nature’ in the king’s stand.9 According to Keilau, his policy implied 
the continuation of a line pursued by the ‘Swedish royal family since 
1814, namely that Sweden and Norway for geographical reasons of com­
mon national interest always should make up a united front in times of 
armed conflict in Europe.’10
It was in order to safeguard peace on the peninsula that Oscar II, in 
agreement with his family, had brought the personally heavy sacrifice of 
relinquishing Norway’s throne after the Storting’s «parliament’s» deci­
sion of June 7, 1905. Gustav V wanted to stand by his family’s tradi­
tional line; his wish was to contribute in such a way that the sacrifice in 
1905 should not have been in vain.11
Later research (and in particular Associate Professor Roald Berg in 
his volume of Norway’s Foreign Policy History) has however maintained 
that the talks which took place between the two countries serve rather to 
illustrate that no climate of trust had yet been established. The declara­
tion of non-aggression -  a document of no great importance, according to 
Berg -  does not represent a rapprochement; on the contrary, it should be 
seen as an expression of a policy which aimed to stake out the frontier 
with Sweden at a time of international conflict.12
7 Christensen, page 20.
8 Keilau 1927, page 250.
9 Keilau 1935, page 250.
10 Keilau 1935, page 252.
11 Ibidem.
12 Berg, page 188.
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Berg notes that the meeting of the three monarchs could be seen as a 
sign of reconciliation on the part of the Swedish royalty, but he thinks 
that King Gustav’s motives were more complex and that the main pur­
pose behind his gesture was to influence the Norwegians not to side with 
the Allies. ‘Both the king’s personal policy and the ambition of the 
Swedish government was to regain Sweden’s leading position in Scandi­
navia, also during the tribulations of war.’13
While both countries preferred to stay neutral, they had different re­
serve positions in case this stand had to be abandoned. Sweden would 
choose the camp of the Central Powers, mainly due to the fact that her 
economy was closely linked up with the German. Geographic position 
goes a long way to explain why and during the war served to perpetuate 
this state of affairs. Only the Baltic Sea separates the two countries and 
during World War I its western part was almost completely under the 
control of Germany. Norway on the other hand had to make sure she 
sided with Great Britain. The Norwegian economy was turned westward, 
and the British controlled the lines of supply. Already hundred years ear­
lier the country had experienced what catastrophic consequences a 
British blockade might have been.
The relationship with Russia further serves to illustrate the two coun­
tries’ different positions. Sweden had originally proposed a closer co­
operation between them, amounting to a de facto alliance, but under the 
condition that a joining of forces with Russia should be excluded. In 
Sweden Russia had traditionally been viewed as the arch enemy, while 
similar feelings were by no means so pronounced in Norway. In fact, a 
certain degree of co-operation between Russia and Norwegian intel­
ligence services had been going on, partly directed against Sweden. Fol­
lowing a request on the part of the Swedes (from late 1913) if the time 
had not come for the Norwegians to share what information about 
Sweden Norway in this way had gained access to, the reply from the Nor­
wegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated bluntly that Russia was not a 
common Swedish-Norwegian enemy. To share information obtained 
through Norwegian-Russian co-operation was out of the question. One 
could not exclude the possibility, the Foreign Minister went on, ‘that 
Norway instead of fighting on the same side as Sweden -  would find her­
self at war with this country.’14
The Swedish invitation of an alliance was rejected on this back­
ground. Real conflicts of interest existed, founded in the two countries’ 
different economic and foreign policy orientation. On the Norwegian side
13 Ibidem.
14 Berg, page 187.
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considerable suspicion concerning the Swedes’ motives also played a 
part. It should be taken into consideration that Norwegian policy was 
still dominated by a generation whose political outlook had been shaped 
during the struggle with Sweden leading up to the split between the two 
countries. Fear of Swedish dominance was not an issue to be treated 
lightly.
The problems experienced during the first weeks of the war were soon 
overcome and replaced by a boom for the Norwegian economy. Like the 
other neutral countries in Western Europe -  Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands -  Norway enjoyed the advantage of being able to trade with 
both the belligerent parties, and their needs increased in almost every 
field. At the same time the war had drastically reduced these countries’ 
own capacity to produce: millions of men had been taken out of their 
civilian jobs and sent to the front; millions of others had been trans­
formed from their peace-time occupations to the war industry.15
The demand for tonnage increased hugely and so did freight rates, 
partly because of losses due to enemy action, but primarily because the 
transport of war materials took up a lot of space (already during the first 
winter of war one-fourth of the British merchant fleet was taken out of 
civilian freight). Besides, the reduced volume was given the tasks of 
transporting goods from more distant locations than earlier (grain had 
to be imported from North-America instead of Russia and the Baltic 
states, etc.) All this created excellent opportunities for a typical shipping 
nation like Norway, with one of the largest merchant fleets in the world. 
Shipping, above all, contributed to the trade surplus which the country 
built up.
Other industries also prospered, including most branches of in­
dustrial production (like Norsk Hydro, which delivered a substantial part 
of the nitrate used in the French ammunition production).16 Mining pro­
ducts were also needed by the war industry. There was an increased 
demand for agricultural products of all kinds, and the British and Ger­
mans outbid each other for Norwegian fish.
After a while two factors made themselves felt in the country’s 
economic life: a scarcity of goods and a surplus of money, which in turn 
led to inflation, black marketeering and stockjobbing. Shipping shares in 
particular were viewed with great hope and optimism. In the capital and 
other places hundreds of new stockbrokers popped up, establishing them­
selves without any formal authorization. Their dealings, not restricted to 
bourses and stockbrokers’ offices, went on in the most irregular forms,
15 Fuglum, 1988, page 487
16 Berg, page 196
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often in cafés and restaurants. Some saw opportunities under more dis­
tant skies. They put money into Siberian and Mexican railway compa­
nies, exploration for oil in Trinidad, the wine industry of Argentina, the 
processing of papyrus in Zululand, etc.
The prevailing money psychosis is illustrated by the following quota­
tion from a contemporary Kristiania newspaper: ‘A gold fever.has broken 
out in the neutral countries, not least in ours... The whole society is in a 
state of dissolution. Useful work is for naive people only, those who do 
not understand the spirit of their time. A stockbroker, on the other hand, 
or a jobber -  he is in tune with the present. And he does not need any 
training -  only knowledge of the multiplication table.’17 People from all 
walks of life joined in. Former errand boys became millionnaires. Some of 
these upstarts even acquired their private castles -  rare in Norway, but 
more plentiful in Denmark and Sweden, where they could be bought 
from representatives of those countries’ nobility, who perhaps had not 
been so much in step with the times.18
Several of these investment objects were, however, loosely founded 
and of a highly speculative nature. They simply disappeared, without 
leaving any other trace than the bitter memory of the capital which 
vanished simultaneously.
Not only private citizens but also the banks were faced with the prob­
lem of making interest-bearing investments. The establishment of new 
and lasting projects was hampered by the drastic upheavals in world 
trade. The placement of money abroad was highly risky so long as the 
outcome of the war remained uncertain (money invested in a losing 
country would be wasted, most likely). The result was that a large pro­
portion of the banks’ disposable funds found their way into speculation, 
primarily on shipping shares.
Both the state and local government greatly expanded their fields of 
activity. Money for this was provided partly through higher taxation and 
partly through loans. The prices of the most important foodstuffs were 
subsidized, as well as rents. A number of ‘councils’ were appointed and 
given a variety of tasks, like the arrangement or supervision of the im­
port of food and raw materials and the distribution of these. The govern­
ment also assumed direct ownership of trade and industry to a degree 
formerly unheard of: ships were bought to secure supplies, also mills 
(which were situated out of reach of German zeppelins). State-run whaling 
along the Norwegian coast got under way to compensate for a shortage of
17 Christensen, page 51.
18 As the most famous literary description of this period may be counted the novel 
“B0r B0rson” (Oslo 1922) by Johan Falkberget.
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fat (the technique of refining was still somewhat lacking and the mar­
garine which resulted was not easily forgotten: ‘a greenish stearin-like 
product with a high melting point so that it got stuck to the palate.’)19
Various decrees provided for example that flour had to be wholemeal, 
that in cafes and restaurants only one main course was allowed on the 
menu and that meat could not be served on Tuesdays and Fridays; the 
farmers were ordered to expand their grain cultivation; the import, pro­
duction and sale of alcohol were restricted etc.
It was a kind of planned economy which was attempted: The authori­
ties tried to get a survey of the country’s resources and distribute them 
by means of regulations and interventions. The word ‘war-communism’ 
has been applied; however, the aim was never to exchange one economic 
system for another, but to ease the functioning of the existing (capitalist) 
one. The interventions took place, accordingly, with the understanding 
and co-operation of the owners of industry and business, and the trade 
organizations were, as a rule, themselves included in the administration 
of the different measures.20
One of the main reasons for the expanded role of the government in the 
economy was a wish to counterbalance the enormous social inequalities 
created by the war. According to the National Bureau of Statistics there 
could be ‘no doubt that the majority of wage earners and salaried men 
have experienced a lowering of living standards (...) to an alarming de­
gree’. In spite of that, the Bureau was of the opinion that only few people 
suffered actual want, at least among those who were fully able-bodied 
(spring 1916).21
While fishermen and farmers prospered in relative terms, the wages 
of workers in industry lagged behind compared to inflation. Government 
employees came out even worse. The scarcity of important foodstuffs -  
like butter, cheese, eggs and potatoes -  led to black-marketeering on a 
large scale, a state of affairs which made life difficult for families with 
small children in particular. In the towns housing famine represented a 
problem for many. One group, especially hard hit was the old, handi­
capped and others without regular income. The savings they might have 
were reduced daily by inflation.
The demonstrative luxury which others simultaneously displayed 
made social inequalities more striking than previously, a factor which 
contributed to the radicalization of the Labour movement which took 
place in these years. Towards the end of the war the Left was split in all
19 T0nnesen, page 68.
20 Furre, page 84-98.
21 Fuglum 1988, page 508.
50 Jan Normann Knutsen
European countries, the deciding factors being how to react to the war 
and the Russian revolution, in addition to differences of a more local na­
ture. In most countries the majority followed the social-democratic 
leadership, while the communists broke out and formed minority parties. 
In Norway, however, this pattern was reversed as the most radical wing 
of the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) gained majority and took over the 
party’s organization.
As far as the period during the war is concerned it has been pointed 
out that the Labour movement in Norway could form its policy more in­
dependently than similar movements in Sweden and Denmark: In 
Sweden the Social-Democrats allied themselves with liberal and radical 
non-socialist parties against war activists who sought to drag the 
country into the war on the side of Germany. In Denmark, the Labour 
movement made common cause with radical non-socialists against 
Schleswig-activists22 who might have landed the country in conflict with 
Germany. These alliances obliged, in the sense that they called for a 
more moderate and acceptable policy in other fields. In Norway, however, 
where no party or group with influence wanted the country to join the 
hostilities, the Labour Party could formulate its points of view without 
such considerations.23
Venstre (a social-liberal party) remained in government all through 
the war. The party rejected all attempts towards a national government 
of unity and a majority in parliament that was big enough to allow it to 
do so. The second biggest party was the Labour party, which in elections 
in 1915 had gained 32% of the votes. However, due to the electoral sys­
tem,24 the party received less than half of the mandates it would have got 
according to a ‘mathematically fair’ computation. The biggest opposition 
party in the Storting was H0yre (the Conservatives). An effective opposi­
tion policy was hampered by the demands of loyalty which the party 
faced in a difficult situation for the country.25 Besides, the government 
sought deliberately to neutralize the opposition through making it a 
partner in day-to-day non-parlamentarian work (representatives of all 
political parties were thus appointed to the different councils which had 
been established and which had come to play an important part in the 
country’s administration). Decisive for Venstre’s triumph in the elections 
of 1915 was that a period of relative prosperity had not yet come to the
22 Schleswig (or Slesvig) had been lost to Prussia in 1864.
23 Bull (d.e.).
24 Only one candidate was chosen from each electoral district. In case no candidate re­
ceived a majority of 50% or more in the first round, a second round was held, in which the 
non-socialist parties often joined forces.
25 Gjerl0w, page 161-183.
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end. The down-turn for the party -  and the prelude to a long epoch when 
no single party comannded a clear majority in the Storting -  did not 
occur until the first election after the war (in 1918).
The importance of Norway’s merchant fleet and the increased value of 
her export gradually led to problems for the country’s policy of neutrality. 
For both belligerent parties it was essential not only to secure their own 
supplies, but as far as possible, to make sure that their enemy did not 
get any.
There were international conventions in peace, which specified what 
kind of goods should be treated as contraband and which could be trans­
ported freely. The rules were, however, open to interpretations and 
should be regarded as a flexible compromise. The right of neutral states 
to continue their peaceful trade was taken into account, as well as the 
need of the warring parties to be able to wage war effectively. In the end, 
how this compromise would work in a situation of war, would depend not 
on judicial interpretations, but on who was in the position to dictate his 
terms backed by superior power.
Given a long-lasting naval conflict, Norway would, in all probability, 
find herself at the mercy of how much leeway Britain would be willing to 
grant her. In relation to Norway, Britain possessed powerful means of 
coercion. Very important was the fact that Britain controlled a world­
wide net of bunker stations. Without access to these the Norwegian mer­
chant fleet could not go on sailing. The industry would grind to a halt be­
cause supplies would not reach it. The fishing fleet would be hit by a lack 
of fuel. The result, in short, would be an economic catastrophe.
The sort of pressure Britain applied against Norway was mainly of an 
indirect kind. Conditions were attached to the ships being allowed to 
bunker and to the delivery of supplies to Norwegian industry and the 
civilian population. Usually the British would demand a guarantee that 
the commodities which Norway imported from the Allies should not be 
re-exported to Germany or her allies, the same applied to goods produced 
by means of raw materials, fuel, etc. which had passed through British 
control. Those who violated the rules ran the risk of being blacklisted; in 
which case they were denied any further supplies.
Initially it was the British legation in Kristiania and the British con­
sulates which controlled this web of agreements, but in the long run this 
became too cumbersome and was replaced by an arrangement by which 
the trade organizations functioned as intermediaries between the British 
and the individual members. The organizations undertook to distribute 
raw materials imported from the Alliance and through inspections to 
make sure that export to the Central Powers did not take place. It could 
reasonably be argued that Norwegian trade organizations thus had come
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close to filling the role of executive organs in the British government’s 
blockade of the Central Powers.26
At the beginning the Norwegian government took no official part in 
these agreements, neither as negotiator nor as signatory. It would be un­
fortunate indeed for the credibility of her neutral position should the 
government be included formally as a partner in arrangements directed 
against one of the belligerent parties. In spite of that, the authorities 
were able to influence the negotiations from behind the scene and from 
1916 gave the agreements its official approval.
The Germans also started to make use of similar methods (ships 
bound for Germany could sail through Norwegian and Swedish terri­
torial waters on their way south to the Baltic, thus unhindered by the 
embargo of the Central Powers declared by Great Britain and France). 
The Germans made it clear that if Norwegian authorities, or trade and 
industry themselves, took steps to reduce trade with Germany, the Ger­
man government would regard this as a breach of neutrality.27 Underly­
ing the subsequent protests from German side was the threat of military 
reprisals. Particularly exposed in this respect was Norway’s merchant 
fleet in international waters.
The export of fish may serve as an example of how Norwegian de­
pendence of Great Britain made -itself felt, and of how the policy of the 
Norwegian government, which aimed at leaving trade policy to the 
traders (officially), was undermined.
The war had created a great demand for fish on the international 
market. By the end of 1915 the Germans, through outbidding their com­
petitors on the fishing grounds, had succeeded in conquering the Nor­
wegian fish market. In Britain this state of affairs attracted considerable 
attention, not least because Norwegian fisheries were dependent on fuel 
and equipment which had to pass through areas controlled by the British 
fleet. A lot of indignation arose from the fact that the Germans could live 
on fish caught by means of British coal, earning Norwegian fishermen a 
fortune, while at the same time the British were fighting for their exist­
ence.
At first the British made an attempt to beat the Germans through 
outbidding them on the open market. The fact that sanctions were not 
threatened at an earlier stage probably had to do with a realization on 
their part of how difficult a control of the scattered coastal population 
would turn out to be (there were 100 000 fishermen and more than 
20 000 vessels of various sizes operating from a long coastline).28 In addi­
26 Berg, page 197.
27 Berg, page 190.
28 Berg, page 198.
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tion it was feared that Norway’s reaction might be to stop the export of 
certain commodities which played an important part in allied war in­
dustry (like the earlier mentioned nitrate from Norsk Hydro).29
With the governments of the three countries (the Norwegian included) 
engaged in buying up fish on the Norwegian market, the prices increased 
drastically, and gradually it became clear that the arrangement would 
become too expensive for the British. While threatening an embargo on 
supplies they demanded downright control over all fish which was not 
consumed by the Norwegians themselves, and that the Norwegian 
government should make sure this control became effective by introduc­
ing a ban on all exports, with a right of dispensation which included 
Great Britain only.
The demand was unacceptable to the Norwegians, who eventually 
managed to negotiate an arrangement which implied that the Central 
Powers would be allowed to purchase a certain percentage of the fish, 
namely a share which was supposed to equal their part of the supplies 
for the fishing fleet (stipulated to 15%). The rest of the exports should go 
to Great Britain, exclusively, at fixed maximum prices.
The difference, compared to Britain’s earlier deals with the trade or­
ganizations, was that the Norwegian government had become involved 
as a partner and guarantor. Since the arrangement in reality limited ex­
port to one of the belligerent parties to the advantage of the others, there 
could be little doubt that it represented a breach with the duties of a 
neutral country according to international law.
The outcome was that the supplies to the fishing fleet had been se­
cured; but, as subsequent events were to show, to a high price in terms of 
foreign policy. Whether it had been necessary for the government to 
yield as much, has been controversial.30
A similar pattern was followed concerning other goods. At one time, 
when the British declared their dissatisfaction with Norway, the Nor­
wegians fulfilled their obligations. The export of coal stopped. Norway 
had stocks which would last only three months of normal consumption. 
The result was rationing -  closed schools, shops and restaurants which 
had to reduce opening hours, locomotives fired by wood, etc. -  until the 
government (after it had concluded, in the meantime, difficult negotia­
tions with Germany over a trade treaty) made sufficient concessions for 
the supply of coal to be resumed. Countermoves were considered, but it 
was decided to give it from a fear that all supplies reaching Norway from 
the west might be stopped.
29 Ibidem.
30 Keilau 1935, page 271-275.
54 Jan Normann Knutsen
In addition to the fact that Norwegian exports by the turn of 1916 to a 
high degree had been brought in line with Britain’s blockade policy, the 
country was also forced to tacitly accept the transport of allied war mate­
rials over Norwegian territory. The route crossed from the coast of Finn- 
mark (Norway’s northernmost county) to Finland (at the time a part of 
the Russian empire). Officially the traffic was described as civilian trade 
undertaken by private citizens; however, few were taken in by this ex­
planation, certainly not the Germans. Ammunition depots along the 
route were set on fire, probably by German agents, although none of the 
culprits were caught. An activist in the cause of Finnish nationalism, 
who was also a German agent, was arrested and found to be carrying, 
among other sabotage equipment, sugar lumps, which (analysis showed) 
contained anthrax bacilli, intended to spread an epidemic among the two 
thousand horses and reindeer which were employed in the transport.31
Far more serious was that Germany from the autumn of 1916 stepped 
up its submarine warfare, which hit Norway particularly hard. The con­
nection between sinkings and German dissatisfaction with Norway’s re­
sources and territory being used in allied service, was initially made by 
the Germans, the intention being to force compliance with Germany’s 
demands. The theory that such a connection did indeed exist has later 
been passed on several historians. Others, however, had emphasized the 
fact that the aim of the German offensive was a more general one: to in­
terrupt allied line of supply. When so many Norwegian ships went down 
it was simply because they were overrepresented in that traffic which at 
that stage was particularly exposed, namely the freight of supplies from 
Britain to Russia. The interpretation that it was a case of reprisals did 
not fail to impress Norwegian public opinion, though; and it 
strengthened the government in its view that it was necessary to keep up 
certain trade with Germany for reasons of neutrality.
From Britain’s point of view the main concern was to prevent Norway 
from being pressured into withdrawing from the allied net of communica­
tion. However, as long as the ships sailed under a neutral flag, they were 
prevented from arming themselves. The British government suggested 
therefore that it should be allowed to buy the Norwegian fleet. The prop­
osition was rejected by Norway for economic and national reasons, and 
instead a solution was found whereby Britain declared its readiness to 
supply Norway with coal and coke transported on British armed ships, 
while Norwegian ships were transferred to more distant and secure wa­
ters, some of them requisitioned by the British and sailed under British
31 Berg, page 209-215.
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flag under an agreement entered into by the ship owners. The Norwegian 
government formally protested against the latter arrangement in an at­
tempt to deceive the Germans.
‘Yet again the Norwegian government had felt itself to be in a situa­
tion where it had no choice.’ If the British wishes were rejected, it was 
feared that Britain would simply requisition all Norwegian ships within 
the area under her control -  without providing for supplies. Prime minis­
ter Knudsen emphasized that a new coal crisis would lead to unemploy­
ment, which again would fuel the social discontent which was brewing, 
inspired by inflation and the Russian revolution.32
The tonnage agreement implied that Norway had taken another step 
towards the allied camp (if not into it, as one allied minister wrote).33 
A Norwegian historian has used the term ‘The Neutral Ally’ to describe 
Norway’s position. The question why the country was not drawn directly 
into hostilities arises on this background.
The Germans did have concrete plans for military actions against 
Norway, but these were associated with the eventuality that the country 
would be drawn closer into the Allies’ military co-operation. The plans 
were of a limited extent (they included bombing of the capital and in­
dustrial plants and mining of the waters off southern Norway).34 An in­
vasion and occupation, like the one during World War II, was out of the 
question. That would bind up troops and resources needed elsewhere. 
On this backdrop the Germans were willing to be bought off Norwegian 
trade concessions, formal declarations of neutrality and diplomatic 
dodges.
From a British point of view Norwegian participation in the war also 
had its drawbacks. The strained allied resources count against; besides, 
a successful German bombing of Norwegian industrial plants would have 
serious implications for parts of the allied war production. The line of the 
British War Cabinet was therefore that Norway should not be en­
couraged to enter the war; on the other hand, she should not receive the 
impression that the Allies would not be capable of defending the country 
if it was forced to join.35
In this article it has been emphasized that Norway’s relationship with 
the belligerent parties was determined primarily by the country’s 
economic dependence on the Allies, in particular Great Britain (after the 
USA had entered the war this picture became even clearer as the US had 
taken over the role of Norway’s main supplier of grain after the import
32 Fuglum 1989, page 311-314.
33 Berg, page 206.
34 Riste, page 184.
35 Riste, page 180-190.
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from Russia and Eastern Europe had ceased as a consequence of the 
war). World War I had, however, also an ideological aspect, where the 
Central Powers were seen as representing militarism and imperial au­
tocracy; while the Allies, on the other hand, stood for a liberal-democratic 
free trade system, an impression which was strenghtened after the USA 
joined the war and the reactionary Russian empire had dropped out of it.
According to a Norwegian historian, “World War I was the first fore­
castle of a total and ideological war between two power blocks. In such a 
war where all available resources, including those of the neutral coun­
tries, were employed to defeat the enemy, there was no longer any room 
for the traditional non-partisan neutrality as a practical-political prin­
ciple. When Norway «through the events of war» was forced to choose 
side, the choice was a given one, also for ideological reasons.’36
Berge Fure, on his part, points to a certain degree of German orienta­
tion in intellectual circles and also writes that the distrust of authoritar­
ian Russia was widespread; still: “The sympathy for the Allies was 
greater than that for the Central Powers. But public opinion was not 
strongly involved, at least not from the start. Most people did not see the 
outcome as a question of life or death.”37
That changed after Germany started to make use of poison gas and 
not least after Norway began to feel the full effect of Germany’s sub­
marine warfare. With that public opinion turned sharply in anti-German 
direction, effectively supported by British propaganda. In addition came 
that both Britain and the USA gave as reason for their declarations of 
war their determination to defend the rights of small neutral countries.
Most of the regulations were dismantled after the war; some lived on, 
however, like rent and price control. The trade organizations, established 
to co-ordinate import, had also come to stay, likewise the increased state 
and country budgets. As earlier mentioned, the expansion in government 
activities had been financed partly through taxes, partly through loans. 
The status at the end of the war was that the national debt had 
grown to proportions like never before. Strong words have been used to 
characterize the situation: ‘a financial decay’ and -  because money 
was granted without the Storting being presented with a general view 
of the country’s economic sitation -  as ‘one of the blackest chapters in 
Norway’s democratic history.’38 Much had been spent on inefficient 
bureaucracy.
36 Berg, page 254.
37 Furre, page 72.
38 Keilau 1935, page 336.
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The value of Norway’s production had increased considerably during 
the war years, but not its volume. Little had been spent on maintenance 
and renewal. The supply situation was partly to blame; to have a lot of 
money was of little help as long as raw materials and machinery could 
not be bought. Vast amounts had been invested in speculative projects or 
in the production of substitutes which peace made superfluous. Other in­
dustries which were profitable given the artificial demand created by the 
war, could not compete afterwards. Great values were lost in this way.
Because of shipping in particular Norway had enjoyed a large foreign 
trade surplus and had been able to build up a considerable currency re­
serves. The restrictions on consumption during the war coupled with this 
affluence led to extensive import in the first years after the war, espe­
cially of consumer goods, the prices of which were still abnormally high. 
Comparatively little was spent on improving the country’s production 
capacity.
Forty-nine per cent of the Norwegian merchant fleet had been lost, 
while around two thousand seamen had lost their lives. Norway had 
suffered more civilian losses at sea than any other country. The war had 
demonstrated that the country was by no means so isolated from 
European power politics as the generation of 1905 would have liked to 
believe. The introspective attitude which had characterized the 1905- 
1914 period was replaced by a more active foreign policy, which particu­
larly aimed at strengthening national interests in the Norwegian Sea. It 
was deliberately attempted to profit from the good-will with the vic­
torious Western powers which Norway’s contributions during the war 
had created. Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard (1920) was the most 
notable achievement of this policy.
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